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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI ANN PEATROSS aka TERRI ' 
ANN DELICf dba HEIDI'S MASSAGE, 
i 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
1
 Case Nos. 14325 
vs. and 14265 
* • 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, WILLIAM ' 
E. DUNN, RALPH Y. McCLURE, and 
PETE KUTULAS, as Commissioners ' 
and DELMAR LARSON, Salt Lake 
County Sheriff, f 
Defendants and Respondents ' 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant initiated this action in the lower 
court to obtain a de novo review of the revocation by the Board 
of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County of her business license 
to operate a massage parlor in Salt Lake County; also to challenge 
the constitutionality of Sections 15-18-6, 10, and 11 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a license revocation hearing was held on April 10, 
1975, wherein the Board of County Commissioners voted to revoke 
plaintiff-appellant's license for allowing an employee to offer 
sex acts for hire, she petitioned the lower court in Case No. 
14265, for a de novo trial regarding the revocation of her license. 
The lower court in its first hearing, treated plaintiff-appellant's 
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complaint as an extraordinary writ, and ruled that her license 
was improperly revoked, after one Board member, who was not 
present at the hearing, and after reading the record, voted 
to revoke, plaintiff-appellantfs license. Plaintiff-appellant 
then appealed to this Honorable Court, the lower court's treatment 
of her complaint as an extraordinary writ of review* 
A second license revocation hearing was then held on 
September 22, 1975, before all three of the County Commissioners 
to reconsider the previous grounds for revocation, plus two addi-
tional grounds. A majority of the Board voted in favor of revo-
cation of plaintiff-appellant's license, and she then petitioned 
the lower court, in Case No. 230771 for a de novo trial regarding 
the second revocation of her license. The lower court dismissed 
plaintiff-appellant's petition for a de novo review of her business 
license, and granted her 10 days to file an extraordinary writ. 
Plaintiff-appellant then elected to appeal the denial of her 
complaint which sought a de novo trial, rather than filing an 
extraordinary writ. 
^ On November 17, 1975, this Court consolidated both appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's 
dismissal of her complaint in Case No. 230771, wherein she sought 
a de novo trial, regarding the revocation of her business license 
by the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, and a 
remand to the lower court for a ruling as to the constitutionality 
of Section 15-18-6, 10, and 11 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County, 1966, as amended. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 10, 1975, a two man quorum of the Board of 
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County met to consider the 
suspension, or revocation, of the business license of Ms,, Terri 
Anne Peatross dba Heidi's Massage (Minutes R. 69). After one of 
plaintiff-appellant's employees, Susan Anderson, testified at the 
hearing that she performed "locals", while nude, for customers 
while employed by plaintiff-appellant (Minutes R. 69-70); plain-
tiff-appellant testified that she was aware of the provisions of 
Sections 15-18-6 and 10 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, prohibiting this type of activity and had 
instructed her employees not to perform these acts (Minutes R. 70). 
When asked by Commissioner McClure whether she had a system of 
checks to insure that the ordinance provisions were complied with, 
plaintiff-appellant testified that she made inspections, but wasn't 
there all of the time, so that the girls were pretty much on their 
own (Minutes R. 70). The matter was then taken under advisement by 
the Commission (Minutes TR. 71). 
On April 15, 1975, at a regular meeting before the entire 
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake, a vote was taken regard-
ing revocation of plaintiff-cippellant's business license. At this 
meeting, Commissioner Dunn abstained from voting since he was not 
present at the April 10, 1975 hearing; the other two Commissioners 
split their votes, one voting to revoke, the other voting not to 
revoke, (Minutes R. 73). Commissioner Dunn then asked to read the 
record of the hearing and agreed to also vote on the matter. 
' • ' ' • . ' . • • • ' • ' . '. • • > > ' • • 
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After reading the minutes of the April 10, 1975 license revo-
cation hearing, Commissioner Dunn, on April 24, 1975, voted to 
revoke the plaintiff-appellant's license (Minutes R. 72). 
On June 18, 1975, Findings of Fact and an Order revoking 
plaintiff-appellant's business license were signed by the Board of 
County Commissioners (Findings of Fact and Order R. 74). 
On July 7, 1975, plaintiff-appellant filed, and subsequently 
amended, a verified complaint and a notice of appeal, seeking a 
de novo trial regarding the revocation of her massage parlor license. 
Defendants-respondents then moved to dismiss plaintiff-appellant's 
amended complaint on the grounds that she was not entitled to a de 
novo hearing regarding the revocation of her license (R. 26). On 
July 31, 1975, in a memorandum decision, the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft ruled that the plaintiff-appellant was not entitled to a de 
novo hearing, and that he was treating plaintiff-appellant's amended 
complaint as an extraordinary writ. He set aside the revocation 
because of irregularities in the voting procedures engaged in by 
the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County (Memorandum 
Decision, R. 56). 
Plaintiff-appellant then filed an appeal from the subse-
quent order denying her application for a trial de novo. (Notice 
of Appeal, R. 114). The entire County Commission then proceeded 
to rehear the original complaint plus two new and independent 
grounds for revocation, after plaintiff-appellant's motion to stay 
the rehearing was denied (Order, R. 115). 
On September 22, 1975, a second hearing before the three 
County Commissioners was held to consider the suspension, or revo-
-4-
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cation, of plaintiff-appellant's business license on the grounds 
that: 1) Susan Anderson, an employee of plaintiff-appellant, 
agreed on February 19, 1975, to massage for hire, while nude, the 
genital area of a Salt Lake County Sheriff's undercover officer, 
contrary to Section 15-18-6 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County, 1966, as amended; 2) that on or about July 17, 1975, 
another employee, Susan Langston, worked as a masseuse at Heidi's 
Massage Parlor, without having obtained a masseuse license, con-
trary to Section 15-18-2 and 10 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County, 1966, as amended; and 3) Kim Le Coure, another employee 
of plaintiff-appellant, agreed, on July 17, 1975, to massage for hire, 
while nude, the genital area of a Salt Lake County Sheriff's under-
cover agent, contrary to Section 15-18-6 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Malt Lake County, 1966, as amended (Notice of Hearing, R. 29). 
Section 15-18-2 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, reads as follows: 
"Sec. 15-18-2. License Required. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to operate, conduct, carry 
on or maintain a massage parlor or engage in the 
business of a masseur in Salt Lake County without 
first obtaining a license to do so." 
Section 15-18-6 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, reads as follows: 
"Sec. 15-18-6. Unlawful Conduct. Masseurs, 
masseuses, massage parlor licensees or their employees 
shall not perform the following acts or offer or agree 
to perform the following acts on any customer, patron 
or other person receiving or desiring to receive their 
services: 
(1) Sexual acts prohibited by Part 13, Chapter 10, 
Title 76, Utah Code* Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
(2) The removal of clothing by a masseur or 
_R_ 
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masseuse so as to display the female breast or 
breasts, or genital area of either sex, or the 
wearing of clothing that intentionally reveals 
the same. 
(3) Any touching of the genital area, 
(4) Allowing the customer to massage, touch or 
fondle the masseur or masseuse. 
(5) No massage shall be given in a locked room 
or enclosure." 
Section 15-18-10 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, reads: 
"Sec. 15-18-10. Revocation or Suspension of 
License. Any unlawful conduct, whether the omission 
to perform an act required by this ordinance, or any 
act prohibited by this ordinance shall be cause for 
revocation or suspension of a massage parlor licensee's 
or masseur's license. The holder of a massage parlor 
license shall have his license revoked or suspended 
for any and all acts or omissions of his employees, 
which are either prohibited or required by any 
provision of this ordinance. 
Any license granted under this title may be sus-
pended or revoked by the County Commission for cause 
as set forth in this title. A minimum of five days 
notice shall be given to the licensee advising him of 
the date and time for hearing and listing the cause 
or causes for such suspension or revocation. If such 
cause also constitutes a criminal act in violation of 
the Revised Ordinances of Salt take County or in 
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, such hear-
ing will be heard independently of such criminal 
charge and shall not be dependent in any way upon the 
filing of or conviction of such charge or charges. 
Section 15-18-11 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, reads: 
"Sec. 15-18-11. Penalties. In addition to the 
revocation or suspension of licenses outlined above, 
a person convicted of any violation of this ordinance 
shall be fined not to exceed $299.00, or imprisonment 
in the Salt lake County Jail not to exceed six months, 
or both." 
-6-
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At the hearing, Deputy Richard Sourez testified that 
Susan Anderson agreed to take off her clothes and massage his genitals 
for $20.00 (Minutes, R. 19). Also presented in evidence was a certi-
ficate from Justice of the Peace, Charles A. Jones wherein he certified 
that, 1) Susan Langston pleaded guilty to a charge of working without 
a masseuse license on July 17, 1975, in Docket #468-093A; and 2) 
Kim Le Coure, aka "Tammy", while working for plaintiff-appellant, 
pleaded guilty to unlawful conduct prohibited under Section 15-18-6 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt lake County, 1966, as amended, for 
her arrest on July 17, 1975, for offering to massage for $15.00, while 
nude, the genital area of Deputy Sourez (Minutes, R. 20 & 28). 
After the hearing of September 22, 1975, Commissioners 
Dunn and McClure voted to revoke plaintiff-appellant's license; Com-
missioner Kutulas voted not to revoke her license (Minutes, R. 24). 
The license was ordered revoked. 
On October 1, 1975, Findings of Fact and an Order revoking 
plaintiff-appellant's business license were then signed by the 
Board of County Commissioners (Findings of Fact, R. 33). 
On October 2, 1975, plaintiff-appellant filed a verified 
complaint and notice of appeal, seeking a de novo trial regarding 
the revocation of her license. Defendants-respondents then moved 
to dismiss plaintiff-appellant's complaint on the grounds that she 
was not entitled to a de novo hearing of the revocation of her 
license (R. 18). On October 22, 1975, the defendants-respondents' 
motion to dismiss was granted, on the grounds that plaintiff-
appellant's first and second causes of action seeking a de novo trial 
were not proper, inasmuch as plaintiff-appellant was only entitled 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to a judicial review of the record of the prior license revocation 
hearing, pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
further, that plaintiff-appellant's third cause of action, seeking 
a declaratory judgment, would not terminate the uncertainty or 
controversy over the revocation of her business license (Order 
R. 60). Plaintiff-appellant was then given 10 days by the lower 
court, to amend her third cause of action in order to file an 
extraordinary writ, under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure which would permit a review of the revocation of her license 
by the Board of County Commissioners (Order, R. 60). 
Plaintiff-appellant elected, instead, to file an appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court, rather than to petition for an extra-
ordinary writ. 
-8-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S APPEAL FROM 
THE REVOCATION OF HER BUSINESS LICENSE 
BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
IS LIMITED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE 
RECORD, BY FILING AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
The right to appeal, in the absence of a governing consti-
tutional provision, may be granted, or withheld, at the discretion 
of the legislature, and does not exist unless specifically granted 
by statute; see Re Grant, 44 Utah 386, 140 P. 226 (1914)— in this 
case, the concurring Justices, Straup and Frick, were even of the 
opinion that where a statute failed to provide for an appeal from 
the revocation of a liquor license by the lower courts, or boards 
of trustees, commissioners, and city councils, there is no right of 
\ appeal. Consequently, appellant<s right of appeal is limited to that 
provided by the legislature, or by the constitution. 
Under the present Rules of Civil Procedure, the only manner 
provided for reviewing the revocation of a business license by the 
Board of County Commissioners is defined by Rule 65B, which is com-
parable to an extraordinary writ. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary Writs 
"(a) Special Forms of Writs Abolished. Special 
forms of pleadings and of writs in habeas corpus, 
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and 
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are 
heretofore abolished. Where no other plain speedy 
:
»"•':•-••';.."'•' and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained 
by appropriate action under these rules, on any one 
of the grounds set forth in subdivision (b) and (f) 
of this rule. 
(b) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may 
be granted: 
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(2) Where an inferior tribunal, board of officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its juris-
diction or abused its discretion; or 
\ (3) Where the relief sought is to compel any 
inferior tribunal, or any corporation, board or 
person to perform an act which the law specially 
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust 
or station; or to compel the admission of a party to 
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which 
he is entitled and from which he is lawfully excluded 
by such inferior tribunal or by such corporation, 
board or person; or 
(4) Where the relief sought is to arrest the 
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or 
person, whether exercising functions judicial or 
ministerial, when such proceedings are without or 
in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, cor-
poration, board of person." (Emphasis added) 
Therefore, where minutes of the license revocation hearing 
were transcribed from tape recordings which captured and preserved 
the complete record of the hearing (Minutes R._20), appellant is 
limited to a judicial re-examination of that record, via a writ of 
review; see Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co,, et al. vs. 
Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, et al., 4 U. 2d 105, 287 
P. 2d 884 (1955). 
Even conceding, for the purposes of argument, that the 
Board of County Commissioners acts as a "tribunal" when it revokes 
a business license, the plaintiff-appellant would only be entitled 
to a review of the record by the district court, under the provisions 
or Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah, which reads: 
"The District Court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal 
not excepted in this Constitution, and not pro-
hibited by law: appellate jurisdiction from all 
inferior courts and tribunals, and a supervisory 
control of the same . . . " (emphasis added) 
-10-
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"Appellate jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to 
review the decision or judgment of an inferior tribunal, 
upon the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, 
reverse or modify such decision; judgment or decree." 
See State vs. Johnson, 100 U. 316, 114 P. 2d 1034 (1941) 
Consequently, the lower court did not err in dismissing 
the plaintiff-appellant's complaint which sought a de novo trial 
concerning the revocation of her license by the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WHICH 
SOUGHT DECLARATORY RELIEF 
Under Section 78-33-6, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, the trial 
court is given wide discretion to refuse to enter a declaratory 
judgment, where such judgment would not terminate the uncertainty 
giving rise to the proceeding. 
"78-33-6. Discretion to deny declaratory relief.— 
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory 
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if 
rendered, would not terminate the uncertainty or 
•' controversy giving rise to the proceeding." 
Therefore, where the quasi-judicial revocation of plaintiff-
appellant's business license was appealable to the district court 
via an extraordinary writ of review pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court did not err in denying 
her complaint which sought declaratory relief and asked to review 
the actions of the Board by testing the constitutionality of the 
ordinances, which were the basis for revoking plaintiff-appellant's 
business license; see Johnson vs. Yeilding, 267 Ala. 108, 100 So. 2d 
29 (1958); and Miami vs. Eldridge (Fla. App.) 126 So. 2d 169 (1956). 
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Especially, where the Court in its order dated October 22, 1975, 
allowed plaintiff-appellant 10 days to amend her complaint to 
petition for an extraordinary writ of review. 
Nor was plainiff-appellant entitled to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the ordinances under which she was licensed. It 
is a well accepted rule of law that a person who obtains a license 
under a law, and for a time enjoys the benefits thereof,cannot 
afterward question the constitutionality of the ordinance, when the 
license is sought to be revoked or suspended. For cases following 
this rule, see: Thomas J. Molloy & Co. vs. Berkshire, (1944, CA2 NY), 
143 F. 2d 218, cert, den 323 U.S. 802, 89 L. Ed. 640, 65 S.Ct. 559, 
reh. den. 324 U.S. 886, 98 L.Ed. 1436, 65 S.Ct. 711; Eichholz vs. 
Hargus, (1938, DC Mo.), 23 F. Supp. 587, affd in 306 U.S. 268, 83 
L.Ed. 641, 59 S.Ct. 532, reh. den. 306 U.S. 669, 83 L.Ed. 1063; 
Gregory vs. Hecke, 73 Cal. App. 2d 268, 238 P. 787 (1925); Wong 
vs. Public Utilities Commission, 33 Hawaii 813 (1936), Crittenden 
County vs. McConnell, 237 Ky 806, 36 S.W. 2d 627 (1931); Appeal 
of Bornstein, 126 Me. 532, 140 A. 194 (1928); Criscuolo vs. Depart-
ment of Public Utilities, 302 Mass. 438, 19 N.E. 2d 708 (1939); 
Morley vs. Wilson, Police Commissioner, 261 Mass. 296, 159 N.E. 41, 
cert. den. 276 U.S. 625, 72 L. ED. 738, 48 S.Ct. 320 (1927); Williams 
vs. Mack, 202 Minn. 402, 278 N.W. 585 (1938); State ex rel. Kehr vs. 
Turner, 210 Mo. 77, 107 S.W. 1064 (1908); Cofman vs. Ousterhous, 40 
N.D. 390, 168 N.W. 826, 18 ALR 219 (1918); State ex rel. Bluemound 
Amusement Park, Inc. vs. Milwaukee, 207 Wis. 199, 240 N.W. 847, 
79 ALR 281 (1932); and Schutt vs. Kenosha, 258 Wis. 83, 44 N.W. 2d 
902 (1950). For an excellent discussion of this rule and the 
i o_ 
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above case, see 65 ALR 2d 660. 
In conclusion, where the certified record indicates that 
the plaintiff-appellant had a license to do business in Salt Lake 
County, and was doing business in Salt Lake County at the time of 
the license revocation hearing, she is now estopped from challenging 
the constitutionality of the ordinances under which she was licensed; 
further, the lower court did not err in dismissing her complaint, 
seeking declaratory judgment. Indeed, had plaintiff-appellant wanted 
to challenge the ordinance provisions, she should have first paid 
her license fees under protest, and then sought declaratory relief; 
instead, she chose to operate, pursuant to three ordinances and then 
to bring suit to challenge the same after the County Commission took 
steps to, and did, properly revoke her license. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court did not err in dismissing plaintiff-
appellant's complaint seeking a de novo trial to review the revocation 
of her business license by the Board of County Commissioners of Salt 
Lake County. Plaintiff-appellant is only entitled to judicial review 
by the lower court of the record of the proceedings before the Board 
of County Commissioners, and therefore the dismissal of her complaint 
should be affirmed. 
Nor was the plaintiff-appellant entitled to challenge the 
constitutionality of the ordinances under which she operated prior to 
the revocation of her business license. Consequently, when she 
elected not to file an extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to review the actions of the Board of 
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County Commissioners, she is estopped from challenging the validity 
of the proceedings and the constitutionality of the ordinance pro-
visions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DONALD SAWAYA 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney 
MARCUS G. THEODORE 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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